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Abstract — The continuing growth of Smartphones and 
Superphones has significantly increased mCommerce. The 
security of personal information on the phone and lack of 
the face-to-face identification has made the authentication 
process prone to identity theft and false impersonation. 
Biometric authentication offers personal identification but 
is missing the real-time and precise-position associated 
with the person. This paper proposes the use of freshly-
generated real-time personal-data and present-position to 
form a “one-time multi-factor biometric” representation. 
i.e. using GPS "time and location" to stamp the user’s 
fresh biometric data on the phone side, and then, the 
authenticator will compare this information with the 
position of the phone obtained independently from the 
cellular network at that instant in time.  
Keywords — Authentication, Cellular Towers, GNSS, 
GPS, Location, Multi-Factor Biometrics, Time 
I. INTRODUCTION
 obile commerce over Smartphones/Superphones 
are becoming part of everyday life, enabling 
financial transactions to be performed anywhere, 
anytime by anyone. From personal security and 
authentication side, this has eliminated the traditional 
face-to-face based business transactions, e.g. inside a 
bank where all involved parties have the "who, where 
and when" clearly defined.  
Traditional authentication factors can be broadly 
categorised into three groups [1]. 1) knowledge-based, 
or something you know, which typically relies on a 
memorised password or a PIN. 2) object-based, or 
something you have, which relies on a physical 
possession such as tokens. 3) Identity-based, or 
something you are, i.e. biometrics, which relies on the 
uniqueness of physical or behaviour characteristics of a 
person such as fingerprint, facial features, iris, or voice. 
A random password can offer an extremely strong 
security mechanism for user authentication. However, 
in practice, secret passwords that humans can easily 
remember are often short and easy to guess [1]. On the 
other hand, the major security drawback of a physical 
token is that, if lost or stolen, an impostor can gain 
unauthorized access. In biometric-based authentication, 
a legitimate user does not need to remember or carry 
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anything and it is known to be more reliable than 
traditional authentication schemes. However, the 
security of biometric systems can be undermined in a 
number of ways. For instance, a biometric template can 
be replaced by an impostor's template in a system 
database or it might be stolen and replayed [2]. 
Current and future generations of Smartphones and 
Superphones have enough gadgets and sensors that can 
be deployed to enable "secure data and authentications" 
for mCommerce. These sensors include camera, finger 
print sensor, and GPS receiver. For example, location 
applications can determine the phone position via the 
GPS data, via the cellular network base station/tower 
triangulation, via Wi-Fi by approximating the distance 
to a known Wi-Fi Access point, or via a combination of 
these. Equally, biometric data can be collected for the 
face, voice, palm vain, or finger print of the person.  
For mCommerce, intelligent biometric-based 
authentication and verification will help identifying the 
person (the "who"), while the GPS data and wireless 
connectivity can identify the exact time (the "when") 
and location of person (the "where") as well as the 
"collected biometric data".  This information, when 
coupled/compiled with secure data connection (using 
SSL for example) and data integrity checking algorithm 
(e.g. hashing) to form a one-time multi-factor biometric 
(OTMFB) representation, shall offer a novel and 
attractive authentication process for Smartphones and 
Superphones to increase security and to identify and 
defeat distance attacks from intruders. 
Furthermore, this paper proposes a novel approach 
that uses the cellular towers as a second source of 
location information, which is completely independent 
from the first location source (GPS receiver on the 
device) to strengthen the security of the application. 
Cellular towers controlled by network operators 
continuously locate mobile phones during their normal 
operation, and most operators in the US, for example, 
uses this location method to comply with the FCC-9-1-1 
requirements [3]. i.e. this cellular network based phone 
location information will be used to cross-check the 
phone position received from the GPS receiver on the 
device itself, independent of the phone-user. 
The work presented in this paper complements the 
previously proposed enhanced multi-biometrics 
authentication technique [4] with the assurance of time 
and location. By conjunction of multi-modal biometric-
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based verification, a user password and two-way 
independent localisation of the mobile device user, the 
three issues of "who, where, and when" can now be 
clearly identified in any remote and mobile secure 
transaction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 
II provides an overview of related work in multi-factor 
biometric authentication and GPS. Section III describes 
the proposed LocBiometrics algorithm. Section IV 
concludes the results and outlines future work. 
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
GPS location and time data has been used to derive a 
unique signature to discover ground distance and 
cyberspace attacks [5]. Such a generated signature can 
be added to documents or digital transactions to verify 
that the document was created or changed at this 
unambiguous defined place and moment in time. The 
idea is that, every bit value from the satellite signals, 
and accordingly the generated signatures, changes every 
20 milliseconds. Therefore, an intercepted signature 
cannot be reused by an attacker to perform a replay 
attack with a faked location. However, the standard 
GPS receivers used in today's mobile devices are not 
suitable for the generation of such required unique 
signatures because they calculate latitude, altitude and 
longitude values directly from the GPS signals. This 
can enable attackers to generate their own set of 
coordinates to forge their real location. In consequence, 
the authenticator cannot be sure if the position was 
really calculated by a GPS receiver on the mobile 
device or was faked by an intruder. 
Another proposed solution uses position and time as 
an additional factor of authentication to reduce identity 
theft [6]. A major problem in today's mobile business 
world is identity theft and impersonation. Around 10 
million Americans were hit by identity theft in 2008, an 
increase of 22 percent compared to the previous year 
[7]. So, this solution compares the received current 
position of the mobile device with a database of pre-
known positions of the points of business agreed / 
associated with the mobile phone user, e.g. an ATM 
machine. i.e. a continuous location tracking of the 
device, as well as a continuous online verification 
system is established to do this. However, continuous 
tracking of mobile devices to ensure that no anomalous 
behaviour has occurred at any point in time is very 
difficult. The devices could be switched off by the 
genuine user, run out of battery power, or monitoring 
range. Another drawback is that the point of sale must 
be pre-known by the verifying side which is not always 
the case in mobile business. 
In the recent past, several publications have proposed 
the use of Multi-Factor Biometric Authentication 
(MFBA) to enhance both security and accuracy of 
biometric systems using different modalities such as 
fingerprints [8], facial features [9], iris [10] and palm 
features [11]. An example of a two-factor biometric 
authentication is the User-Based Transformation 
(UBT). Typically, UBTs employ transformation keys 
generated from passwords/PINs or retrieved from a 
token. Random orthonormal projection can be consider 
as a simple but effective UBTs [12]. This uses random 
orthonormal matrices to project biometric features into 
other (secure) spaces where the distances among the 
data points before and after the transform are preserved. 
Although MFBA systems offer better security when 
certain requirements are met [13], replay attack remains 
one of the challenges that current MFBA systems are 
unable to prevent. 
III. LOCBIOMETRICS ALGORITHM
The LocBiometrics process ensures that the biometric 
features do belong to the genuine and physically-
present user by stamping his/her real-time collected and 
generated biometric data. i.e. the tight combination of a 
real-time biometric generated key (who actually you are 
now), a password (something secure you only know), 
with location (where you are now) and real-time shall 
strengthens the security of the authentication 
process.
Fig. 1. OTMFB message generation process 
To achieve this, genuine users need to enrol their 
biometrics (e.g. face, voice and/or fingerprint), a 
password/PIN and the locations where he/she is likely 
to operate with their business partner. i.e. a biometric 
template is generated out of the presented biometrics 
and stored together with a hashed value of the chosen 
user password/PIN and the area of user operation. Once 
the user needs to perform a secure transaction with the 
business partner, an authentication process is triggered 
as shown in Fig. 1. The proposed multi-factor 
biometric-hash algorithm combines the user fresh 
biometrics from the mobile phone sensors with the 
password, then uses the hashed GPS time and location 
values to produce a one-time permutation to be applied 
on the biometric features. A proprietary pseudo random 
permutation generation scheme is used. This scheme 
relies on DES-like S-boxes to produce a secure one-
way permutation for any given seed.  Then a user-based 
random orthonormal projection [12] is generated from 
the password/PIN to transform the biometric features to 
a secure domain. The generated One Time Multi-Factor 
Biometric (OTMFB) representation is sent together 
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with the actual GPS time, location, information about 
the used mobile device and the actual transaction 
message over a secure connection to the authenticator 
side (e.g. a bank). 
The current time and position of the device are the 
critical one-time factors that will be employed every 
time to prevent the replay attacks .The time and position 
will be thereby extracted from the GGA (Global 
Positioning System Fix Data) message generated every 
second by the GPS receiver [14]. 
Fig. 2. User verification process 
During the verification process (see Fig. 2.), the 
authenticator extracts the time, location, OTMFB and 
device information from the message and verifies, as a 
first step, that the transmitted location is inside the 
agreed area of operation of the particular device and 
user. It follows this by requesting the current position of 
the phone from the cellular network operator, using U-
TDOA of signals from the serving and secondary base 
stations around that phone at that time, shown in Fig. 3. 
The U-TDOA user verification process of cellular 
signals reaching different network towers in range of 
the mobile device can achieve an accuracy of 
approximately 50 meters, depending on the area of 
operation [15]. 
So, the authenticator shall verify that the device is 
actually at the claimed location by comparing the 
transmitted GPS position from the phone and the 
position gained from the network operator. If the 
location difference is within a certain threshold, the 
device is confirmed to be at the claimed position at that 
point in time. The authenticator will then use the 
enrolled biometric template, the password/PIN hash 
value as well as the time and location information to 
generate a fresh local OTMFB’. This is compared with 
the received OTMFB from the user to verify the user is 
genuine and to ensure that replay attack has not 
occurred.
IV. RESULTS
To test the viability of the proposed scheme, 
fingerprint and face biometrics are used in the way 
described in [12]. Let x1, x2 be two fixed size biometric 
feature vectors of a user extracted from a face or a 
fingerprint (say x1 is freshly extracted for 
authentication and x2 is saved during the enrolment 
stage in an enterprise database), the Euclidian distance 
that is used at the matching stage between the two 
vectors is given by: 
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Let y1, y2 be the two OTMFB representations of x1, x2
created by our proposed scheme, the Euclidean distance 
between y1, y2 will be as follows: 
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Where O=PA is an orthonormal matrix. 
The Euclidean distances between the two OTMFB 
representations of a user equals to the Euclidean 
distances between the two feature vectors of his 
biometric samples. However, experiments show that 
when x1, x2 belong to two different individuals (i.e. a 
user-based P and A are used), the Euclidean distances 
increase which results in better security and accuracy. 
Several measurements of phone-GPS position at 
various locations and comparing these to positions 
obtained from the cellular network serving the phone at 
that location has concluded that an error of up to 300 
meters can result. This is deemed to be OK for the 
purpose of this authentication process.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, this paper proposes a novel technique 
to verify the claimed position of a user within a remote 
business transaction. The combination of two 
independent positions obtained (GPS/GNSS receiver on 
the mobile device and cellular towers controlled by the 
network operators) to locate and verify the claimed 
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position of a mobile device will limit the fraud-attack 
possibilities and avoid certain distance attacks 
commonly existing in various identity theft scenarios. 
This is then combined with multi-model biometric 
verification to establish a multi-factor authentication 
based on various biometric data (e.g. face, voice or 
fingerprint), a user password as well as location and 
time information. Integration of time and location into 
the authentication process ensures that it is a secure-live 
communication and thus reduces the possibility of 
replay attacks. 
Fig. 3. Accuracy range of towers vs. GPS 
Work on this LocBiometrics algorithm is ongoing to 
further combine the real-time and location information 
coming from the GPS receiver to become an essential 
and completely integrated part of the generated One 
Time Multi-Factor Biometric on the device. i.e. only 
one hashed version of the information is sent over the 
secure connection. Also, the verifying side will use the 
time and location information received from the second 
independent source (the cellular towers) together with 
the pre-enrolled biometric template and user password 
to securely identify the user and to verify the claimed 
position of the device. 
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